Quelle  Alloc.thy

(*  Title:      HOL/UNITY/Comp/Alloc.thy
  Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
  Copyright 1998 University of Cambridge
 
 Specification of Chandy and Charpentier's Allocator
*)

theory Alloc
imports AllocBase "../PPROD"
begin

subsection‹State definitions. OUTPUT variables are locals›

record clientState =
  giv :: "nat list"   🍋 ‹client's INPUT history: tokens GRANTED›
  ask :: "nat list"   🍋 ‹client's OUTPUT history: tokens REQUESTED›
  rel :: "nat list"   🍋 ‹client's OUTPUT history: tokens RELEASED›

record 'a clientState_d =
  clientState +
  dummy :: 'a       🍋 ‹dummy field for new variables›

definition
  🍋 ‹DUPLICATED FROM Client.thy, but with "tok" removed›
  🍋 ‹Maybe want a special theory section to declare such maps›
  non_dummy :: "'a clientState_d => clientState"
  where "non_dummy s = (|giv = giv s, ask = ask s, rel = rel s|)"

definition
  🍋 ‹Renaming map to put a Client into the standard form›
  client_map :: "'a clientState_d => clientState*'a"
  where "client_map = funPair non_dummy dummy"


record allocState =
  allocGiv :: "nat => nat list"   🍋 ‹OUTPUT history: source of "giv" for i›
  allocAsk :: "nat => nat list"   🍋 ‹INPUT: allocator's copy of "ask" for i›
  allocRel :: "nat => nat list"   🍋 ‹INPUT: allocator's copy of "rel" for i›

record 'a allocState_d =
  allocState +
  dummy    :: 'a                🍋 ‹dummy field for new variables›

record 'a systemState =
  allocState +
  client :: "nat => clientState"  🍋 ‹states of all clients›
  dummy  :: 'a                    🍋 ‹dummy field for new variables›


subsubsection ‹Resource allocation system specification›

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (1)›
  system_safety :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "system_safety =
     Always {s. (∑i ∈ lessThan Nclients. (tokens o giv o sub i o client)s)
     ≤ NbT + (∑i ∈ lessThan Nclients. (tokens o rel o sub i o client)s)}"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (2)›
  system_progress :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "system_progress = (INT i : lessThan Nclients.
                        INT h.
                          {s. h ≤ (ask o sub i o client)s} LeadsTo
                          {s. h pfixLe (giv o sub i o client) s})"

definition
  system_spec :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "system_spec = system_safety Int system_progress"


subsubsection ‹Client specification (required)›

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (3)›
  client_increasing :: "'a clientState_d program set"
  where "client_increasing = UNIV guarantees Increasing ask Int Increasing rel"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (4)›
  client_bounded :: "'a clientState_d program set"
  where "client_bounded = UNIV guarantees Always {s. ∀elt ∈ set (ask s). elt ≤ NbT}"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (5)›
  client_progress :: "'a clientState_d program set"
  where "client_progress =
         Increasing giv guarantees
         (INT h. {s. h ≤ giv s & h pfixGe ask s}
                 LeadsTo {s. tokens h ≤ (tokens o rel) s})"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec: preserves part›
  client_preserves :: "'a clientState_d program set"
  where "client_preserves = preserves giv Int preserves clientState_d.dummy"

definition
  🍋 ‹environmental constraints›
  client_allowed_acts :: "'a clientState_d program set"
  where "client_allowed_acts =
       {F. AllowedActs F =
            insert Id (∪ (Acts ` preserves (funPair rel ask)))}"

definition
  client_spec :: "'a clientState_d program set"
  where "client_spec = client_increasing Int client_bounded Int client_progress
                    Int client_allowed_acts Int client_preserves"


subsubsection ‹Allocator specification (required)›

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (6)›
  alloc_increasing :: "'a allocState_d program set"
  where "alloc_increasing =
         UNIV guarantees
         (INT i : lessThan Nclients. Increasing (sub i o allocGiv))"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (7)›
  alloc_safety :: "'a allocState_d program set"
  where "alloc_safety =
         (INT i : lessThan Nclients. Increasing (sub i o allocRel))
         guarantees
         Always {s. (∑i ∈ lessThan Nclients. (tokens o sub i o allocGiv)s)
         ≤ NbT + (∑i ∈ lessThan Nclients. (tokens o sub i o allocRel)s)}"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (8)›
  alloc_progress :: "'a allocState_d program set"
  where "alloc_progress =
         (INT i : lessThan Nclients. Increasing (sub i o allocAsk) Int
                                     Increasing (sub i o allocRel))
         Int
         Always {s. ∀i
                     ∀elt ∈ set ((sub i o allocAsk) s). elt ≤ NbT}
         Int
         (INT i : lessThan Nclients.
          INT h. {s. h ≤ (sub i o allocGiv)s & h pfixGe (sub i o allocAsk)s}
                 LeadsTo
                 {s. tokens h ≤ (tokens o sub i o allocRel)s})
         guarantees
             (INT i : lessThan Nclients.
              INT h. {s. h ≤ (sub i o allocAsk) s}
                     LeadsTo
                     {s. h pfixLe (sub i o allocGiv) s})"

  (*NOTE: to follow the original paper, the formula above should have had
  INT h. {s. h i ≤ (sub i o allocGiv)s & h i pfixGe (sub i o allocAsk)s}
  LeadsTo
  {s. tokens h i ≤ (tokens o sub i o allocRel)s})
  thus h should have been a function variable. However, only h i is ever
    looked at.*)

definition
  🍋 ‹spec: preserves part›
  alloc_preserves :: "'a allocState_d program set"
  where "alloc_preserves = preserves allocRel Int preserves allocAsk Int
                        preserves allocState_d.dummy"

definition
  🍋 ‹environmental constraints›
  alloc_allowed_acts :: "'a allocState_d program set"
  where "alloc_allowed_acts =
       {F. AllowedActs F =
            insert Id (∪(Acts ` (preserves allocGiv)))}"

definition
  alloc_spec :: "'a allocState_d program set"
  where "alloc_spec = alloc_increasing Int alloc_safety Int alloc_progress Int
                   alloc_allowed_acts Int alloc_preserves"


subsubsection ‹Network specification›

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (9.1)›
  network_ask :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "network_ask = (INT i : lessThan Nclients.
                        Increasing (ask o sub i o client) guarantees
                        ((sub i o allocAsk) Fols (ask o sub i o client)))"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (9.2)›
  network_giv :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "network_giv = (INT i : lessThan Nclients.
                        Increasing (sub i o allocGiv)
                        guarantees
                        ((giv o sub i o client) Fols (sub i o allocGiv)))"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec (9.3)›
  network_rel :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "network_rel = (INT i : lessThan Nclients.
                        Increasing (rel o sub i o client)
                        guarantees
                        ((sub i o allocRel) Fols (rel o sub i o client)))"

definition
  🍋 ‹spec: preserves part›
  network_preserves :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "network_preserves =
       preserves allocGiv Int
       (INT i : lessThan Nclients. preserves (rel o sub i o client) Int
                                   preserves (ask o sub i o client))"

definition
  🍋 ‹environmental constraints›
  network_allowed_acts :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "network_allowed_acts =
       {F. AllowedActs F = insert Id
         (∪ (Acts ` (preserves allocRel ∩ (∩i
           preserves (giv ∘ sub i ∘ client)))))}"

definition
  network_spec :: "'a systemState program set"
  where "network_spec = network_ask Int network_giv Int
                     network_rel Int network_allowed_acts Int
                     network_preserves"


subsubsection ‹State mappings›

definition
  sysOfAlloc :: "((nat => clientState) * 'a) allocState_d => 'a systemState"
  where "sysOfAlloc = (%s. let (cl,xtr) = allocState_d.dummy s
                       in (| allocGiv = allocGiv s,
                             allocAsk = allocAsk s,
                             allocRel = allocRel s,
                             client = cl,
                             dummy = xtr|))"


definition
  sysOfClient :: "(nat => clientState) * 'a allocState_d => 'a systemState"
  where "sysOfClient = (%(cl,al). (| allocGiv = allocGiv al,
                                 allocAsk = allocAsk al,
                                 allocRel = allocRel al,
                                 client = cl,
                                 systemState.dummy = allocState_d.dummy al|))"

axiomatization Alloc :: "'a allocState_d program"
  where Alloc: "Alloc ∈ alloc_spec"

axiomatization Client :: "'a clientState_d program"
  where Client: "Client ∈ client_spec"

axiomatization Network :: "'a systemState program"
  where Network: "Network ∈ network_spec"

definition System  :: "'a systemState program"
  where "System = rename sysOfAlloc Alloc ⊔ Network ⊔
                 (rename sysOfClient
                  (plam x: lessThan Nclients. rename client_map Client))"


(**
 locale System =
  fixes
  Alloc :: 'a allocState_d program
  Client :: 'a clientState_d program
  Network :: 'a systemState program
  System :: 'a systemState program
 
  assumes
  Alloc "Alloc : alloc_spec"
  Client "Client : client_spec"
  Network "Network : network_spec"
 
  defines
  System_def
  "System == rename sysOfAlloc Alloc
  ⊔
  Network
  ⊔
  (rename sysOfClient
  (plam x: lessThan Nclients. rename client_map Client))"
**)

declare subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD, intro]
declare subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD, simp]
declare funPair_o_distrib [simp]
declare Always_INT_distrib [simp]
declare o_apply [simp del]

(*For rewriting of specifications related by "guarantees"*)
lemmas [simp] =
  rename_image_constrains
  rename_image_stable
  rename_image_increasing
  rename_image_invariant
  rename_image_Constrains
  rename_image_Stable
  rename_image_Increasing
  rename_image_Always
  rename_image_leadsTo
  rename_image_LeadsTo
  rename_preserves
  rename_image_preserves
  lift_image_preserves
  bij_image_INT
  bij_is_inj [THEN image_Int]
  bij_image_Collect_eq

ML ‹
(*Splits up conjunctions & intersections: like CONJUNCTS in the HOL system*)
fun list_of_Int th =
    (list_of_Int (th RS conjunct1) @ list_of_Int (th RS conjunct2))
    handle THM _ => (list_of_Int (th RS @{thm IntD1}) @ list_of_Int (th RS @{thm IntD2}))
    handle THM _ => (list_of_Int (th RS @{thm INT_D}))
    handle THM _ => (list_of_Int (th RS @{thm bspec}))
    handle THM _ => [th];
›

lemmas lessThanBspec = lessThan_iff [THEN iffD2, THEN [2] bspec]

attribute_setup normalized = ‹
 let
  fun normalized th =
  normalized (th RS spec
  handle THM _ => th RS @{thm lessThanBspec}
  handle THM _ => th RS @{thm bspec}
  handle THM _ => th RS (@{thm guarantees_INT_right_iff} RS iffD1))
  handle THM _ => th;
 in
  Scan.succeed (Thm.rule_attribute [] (K normalized))
 end
 ›

(*** bijectivity of sysOfAlloc [MUST BE AUTOMATED] ***)
ML ‹
 fun record_auto_tac ctxt =
  let val ctxt' =
  ctxt addSWrapper Record.split_wrapper
  addsimps
  [@{thm sysOfAlloc_def}, @{thm sysOfClient_def},
  @{thm client_map_def}, @{thm non_dummy_def}, @{thm funPair_def},
  @{thm o_apply}, @{thm Let_def}]
  in auto_tac ctxt' end;
 
 ›

method_setup record_auto = ‹Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD o record_auto_tac)›

lemma inj_sysOfAlloc [iff]: "inj sysOfAlloc"
  apply (unfold sysOfAlloc_def Let_def)
  apply (rule inj_onI)
  apply record_auto
  done

text‹We need the inverse; also having it simplifies the proof of surjectivity›
lemma inv_sysOfAlloc_eq [simp]: "!!s. inv sysOfAlloc s =
             (| allocGiv = allocGiv s,
                allocAsk = allocAsk s,
                allocRel = allocRel s,
                allocState_d.dummy = (client s, dummy s) |)"
  apply (rule inj_sysOfAlloc [THEN inv_f_eq])
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma surj_sysOfAlloc [iff]: "surj sysOfAlloc"
  apply (simp add: surj_iff_all)
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma bij_sysOfAlloc [iff]: "bij sysOfAlloc"
  apply (blast intro: bijI)
  done


subsubsection‹bijectivity of 🍋‹sysOfClient›\
lemma inj_sysOfClient [iff]: "inj sysOfClient"
  apply (unfold sysOfClient_def)
  apply (rule inj_onI)
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma inv_sysOfClient_eq [simp]: "!!s. inv sysOfClient s =
             (client s,
              (| allocGiv = allocGiv s,
                 allocAsk = allocAsk s,
                 allocRel = allocRel s,
                 allocState_d.dummy = systemState.dummy s|) )"
  apply (rule inj_sysOfClient [THEN inv_f_eq])
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma surj_sysOfClient [iff]: "surj sysOfClient"
  apply (simp add: surj_iff_all)
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma bij_sysOfClient [iff]: "bij sysOfClient"
  apply (blast intro: bijI)
  done


subsubsection‹bijectivity of 🍋‹client_map›\
lemma inj_client_map [iff]: "inj client_map"
  apply (unfold inj_on_def)
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma inv_client_map_eq [simp]: "!!s. inv client_map s =
             (%(x,y).(|giv = giv x, ask = ask x, rel = rel x,
                       clientState_d.dummy = y|)) s"
  apply (rule inj_client_map [THEN inv_f_eq])
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma surj_client_map [iff]: "surj client_map"
  apply (simp add: surj_iff_all)
  apply record_auto
  done

lemma bij_client_map [iff]: "bij client_map"
  apply (blast intro: bijI)
  done


text‹o-simprules for 🍋‹client_map›\›

lemma fst_o_client_map: "fst o client_map = non_dummy"
  apply (unfold client_map_def)
  apply (rule fst_o_funPair)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("fst_o_client_map'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm fst_o_client_map})›
declare fst_o_client_map' [simp]

lemma snd_o_client_map: "snd o client_map = clientState_d.dummy"
  apply (unfold client_map_def)
  apply (rule snd_o_funPair)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("snd_o_client_map'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm snd_o_client_map})›
declare snd_o_client_map' [simp]


subsection‹o-simprules for 🍋‹sysOfAlloc› [MUST BE AUTOMATED]›

lemma client_o_sysOfAlloc: "client o sysOfAlloc = fst o allocState_d.dummy "
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("client_o_sysOfAlloc'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm client_o_sysOfAlloc})›
declare client_o_sysOfAlloc' [simp]

lemma allocGiv_o_sysOfAlloc_eq: "allocGiv o sysOfAlloc = allocGiv"
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocGiv_o_sysOfAlloc_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocGiv_o_sysOfAlloc_eq})›
declare allocGiv_o_sysOfAlloc_eq' [simp]

lemma allocAsk_o_sysOfAlloc_eq: "allocAsk o sysOfAlloc = allocAsk"
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocAsk_o_sysOfAlloc_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocAsk_o_sysOfAlloc_eq})›
declare allocAsk_o_sysOfAlloc_eq' [simp]

lemma allocRel_o_sysOfAlloc_eq: "allocRel o sysOfAlloc = allocRel"
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocRel_o_sysOfAlloc_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocRel_o_sysOfAlloc_eq})›
declare allocRel_o_sysOfAlloc_eq' [simp]


subsection‹o-simprules for 🍋‹sysOfClient› [MUST BE AUTOMATED]›

lemma client_o_sysOfClient: "client o sysOfClient = fst"
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("client_o_sysOfClient'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm client_o_sysOfClient})›
declare client_o_sysOfClient' [simp]

lemma allocGiv_o_sysOfClient_eq: "allocGiv o sysOfClient = allocGiv o snd "
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocGiv_o_sysOfClient_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocGiv_o_sysOfClient_eq})›
declare allocGiv_o_sysOfClient_eq' [simp]

lemma allocAsk_o_sysOfClient_eq: "allocAsk o sysOfClient = allocAsk o snd "
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocAsk_o_sysOfClient_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocAsk_o_sysOfClient_eq})›
declare allocAsk_o_sysOfClient_eq' [simp]

lemma allocRel_o_sysOfClient_eq: "allocRel o sysOfClient = allocRel o snd "
  apply record_auto
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocRel_o_sysOfClient_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocRel_o_sysOfClient_eq})›
declare allocRel_o_sysOfClient_eq' [simp]

lemma allocGiv_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq: "allocGiv o inv sysOfAlloc = allocGiv"
  apply (simp add: o_def)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocGiv_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocGiv_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq})›
declare allocGiv_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq' [simp]

lemma allocAsk_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq: "allocAsk o inv sysOfAlloc = allocAsk"
  apply (simp add: o_def)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocAsk_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocAsk_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq})›
declare allocAsk_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq' [simp]

lemma allocRel_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq: "allocRel o inv sysOfAlloc = allocRel"
  apply (simp add: o_def)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("allocRel_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm allocRel_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq})›
declare allocRel_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq' [simp]

lemma rel_inv_client_map_drop_map: "(rel o inv client_map o drop_map i o inv sysOfClient) =
      rel o sub i o client"
  apply (simp add: o_def drop_map_def)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("rel_inv_client_map_drop_map'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm rel_inv_client_map_drop_map})›
declare rel_inv_client_map_drop_map [simp]

lemma ask_inv_client_map_drop_map: "(ask o inv client_map o drop_map i o inv sysOfClient) =
      ask o sub i o client"
  apply (simp add: o_def drop_map_def)
  done

ML ‹ML_Thms.bind_thms ("ask_inv_client_map_drop_map'", make_o_equivs 🍋 @{thm ask_inv_client_map_drop_map})›
declare ask_inv_client_map_drop_map [simp]


text‹Client : 🚫specification>›
lemmas client_spec_simps =
  client_spec_def client_increasing_def client_bounded_def
  client_progress_def client_allowed_acts_def client_preserves_def
  guarantees_Int_right

ML ‹
 val [Client_Increasing_ask, Client_Increasing_rel,
  Client_Bounded, Client_Progress, Client_AllowedActs,
  Client_preserves_giv, Client_preserves_dummy] =
  @{thm Client} |> simplify (🍋 addsimps @{thms client_spec_simps})
  |> list_of_Int;
 
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_Increasing_ask", Client_Increasing_ask);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_Increasing_rel", Client_Increasing_rel);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_Bounded", Client_Bounded);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_Progress", Client_Progress);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_AllowedActs", Client_AllowedActs);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_preserves_giv", Client_preserves_giv);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Client_preserves_dummy", Client_preserves_dummy);
 ›

declare
  Client_Increasing_ask [iff]
  Client_Increasing_rel [iff]
  Client_Bounded [iff]
  Client_preserves_giv [iff]
  Client_preserves_dummy [iff]


text‹Network : 🚫specification>›
lemmas network_spec_simps =
  network_spec_def network_ask_def network_giv_def
  network_rel_def network_allowed_acts_def network_preserves_def
  ball_conj_distrib

ML ‹
 val [Network_Ask, Network_Giv, Network_Rel, Network_AllowedActs,
  Network_preserves_allocGiv, Network_preserves_rel,
  Network_preserves_ask] =
  @{thm Network} |> simplify (🍋 addsimps @{thms network_spec_simps})
  |> list_of_Int;
 
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_Ask", Network_Ask);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_Giv", Network_Giv);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_Rel", Network_Rel);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_AllowedActs", Network_AllowedActs);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_preserves_allocGiv", Network_preserves_allocGiv);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_preserves_rel", Network_preserves_rel);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Network_preserves_ask", Network_preserves_ask);
 ›

declare Network_preserves_allocGiv [iff]

declare
  Network_preserves_rel [simp]
  Network_preserves_ask [simp]

declare
  Network_preserves_rel [simplified o_def, simp]
  Network_preserves_ask [simplified o_def, simp]

text‹Alloc : 🚫specification>›
lemmas alloc_spec_simps =
  alloc_spec_def alloc_increasing_def alloc_safety_def
  alloc_progress_def alloc_allowed_acts_def alloc_preserves_def

ML ‹
 val [Alloc_Increasing_0, Alloc_Safety, Alloc_Progress, Alloc_AllowedActs,
  Alloc_preserves_allocRel, Alloc_preserves_allocAsk,
  Alloc_preserves_dummy] =
  @{thm Alloc} |> simplify (🍋 addsimps @{thms alloc_spec_simps})
  |> list_of_Int;
 
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_Increasing_0", Alloc_Increasing_0);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_Safety", Alloc_Safety);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_Progress", Alloc_Progress);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_AllowedActs", Alloc_AllowedActs);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_preserves_allocRel", Alloc_preserves_allocRel);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_preserves_allocAsk", Alloc_preserves_allocAsk);
 ML_Thms.bind_thm ("Alloc_preserves_dummy", Alloc_preserves_dummy);
 ›

text‹Strip off the INT in the guarantees postcondition›

lemmas Alloc_Increasing = Alloc_Increasing_0 [normalized]

declare
  Alloc_preserves_allocRel [iff]
  Alloc_preserves_allocAsk [iff]
  Alloc_preserves_dummy [iff]


subsection‹Components Lemmas [MUST BE AUTOMATED]›

lemma Network_component_System: "Network ⊔
      ((rename sysOfClient
        (plam x: (lessThan Nclients). rename client_map Client)) ⊔
       rename sysOfAlloc Alloc)
      = System"
  by (simp add: System_def Join_ac)

lemma Client_component_System: "(rename sysOfClient
       (plam x: (lessThan Nclients). rename client_map Client)) ⊔
      (Network ⊔ rename sysOfAlloc Alloc) = System"
  by (simp add: System_def Join_ac)

lemma Alloc_component_System: "rename sysOfAlloc Alloc ⊔
       ((rename sysOfClient (plam x: (lessThan Nclients). rename client_map Client)) ⊔
        Network) = System"
  by (simp add: System_def Join_ac)

declare
  Client_component_System [iff]
  Network_component_System [iff]
  Alloc_component_System [iff]


text‹* These preservation laws should be generated automatically *›

lemma Client_Allowed [simp]: "Allowed Client = preserves rel Int preserves ask"
  by (auto simp add: Allowed_def Client_AllowedActs safety_prop_Acts_iff)

lemma Network_Allowed [simp]: "Allowed Network =
        preserves allocRel Int
        (INT i: lessThan Nclients. preserves(giv o sub i o client))"
  by (auto simp add: Allowed_def Network_AllowedActs safety_prop_Acts_iff)

lemma Alloc_Allowed [simp]: "Allowed Alloc = preserves allocGiv"
  by (auto simp add: Allowed_def Alloc_AllowedActs safety_prop_Acts_iff)

text‹needed in ‹rename_client_map_tac›\›
lemma OK_lift_rename_Client [simp]: "OK I (%i. lift i (rename client_map Client))"
  apply (rule OK_lift_I)
  apply auto
  apply (drule_tac w1 = rel in subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
  apply (drule_tac [2] w1 = ask in subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
  apply (auto simp add: o_def split_def)
  done

lemma fst_lift_map_eq_fst [simp]: "fst (lift_map i x) i = fst x"
apply (insert fst_o_lift_map [of i])
apply (drule fun_cong [where x=x])
apply (simp add: o_def)
done

lemma fst_o_lift_map' [simp]:
     "(f ∘ sub i ∘ fst ∘ lift_map i ∘ g) = f o fst o g"
apply (subst fst_o_lift_map [symmetric])
apply (simp only: o_assoc)
done


(*The proofs of rename_Client_Increasing, rename_Client_Bounded and
  rename_Client_Progress are similar. All require copying out the original
  Client property. A forward proof can be constructed as follows:
 
  Client_Increasing_ask RS
  (bij_client_map RS rename_rename_guarantees_eq RS iffD2)
  RS (lift_lift_guarantees_eq RS iffD2)
  RS guarantees_PLam_I
  RS (bij_sysOfClient RS rename_rename_guarantees_eq RS iffD2)
  |> simplify (simpset() addsimps [lift_image_eq_rename, o_def, split_def,
  surj_rename])
 
 However, the "preserves" property remains to be discharged, and the unfolding
 of "o" and "sub" complicates subsequent reasoning.
 
 The following tactic works for all three proofs, though it certainly looks
 ad-hoc!
*)
ML
‹
 fun rename_client_map_tac ctxt =
  EVERY [
  simp_tac (ctxt addsimps [@{thm rename_guarantees_eq_rename_inv}]) 1,
  resolve_tac ctxt @{thms guarantees_PLam_I} 1,
  assume_tac ctxt 2,
         (*preserves: routine reasoning*)
    asm_simp_tac (ctxt addsimps [@{thm lift_preserves_sub}]) 2,
         (*the guarantee for  "lift i (rename client_map Client)" *)
    asm_simp_tac
        (ctxt addsimps [@{thm lift_guarantees_eq_lift_inv},
                      @{thm rename_guarantees_eq_rename_inv},
                      @{thm bij_imp_bij_inv}, @{thm surj_rename},
                      @{thm inv_inv_eq}]) 1,
    asm_simp_tac
        (ctxt addsimps [@{thm o_def}, @{thm non_dummy_def}, @{thm guarantees_Int_right}]) 1]
›

method_setup rename_client_map = ‹
  Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD (rename_client_map_tac ctxt))
 ›

text‹Lifting ‹Client_Increasing› to 🍋‹systemState›\<close>
lemma rename_Client_Increasing: "i ∈ I
      ==> rename sysOfClient (plam x: I. rename client_map Client) ∈
            UNIV guarantees
            Increasing (ask o sub i o client) Int
            Increasing (rel o sub i o client)"
  by rename_client_map

lemma preserves_sub_fst_lift_map: "[| F ∈ preserves w; i ≠ j |]
      ==> F ∈ preserves (sub i o fst o lift_map j o funPair v w)"
  apply (auto simp add: lift_map_def split_def linorder_neq_iff o_def)
  apply (drule_tac [!] subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
  apply (auto simp add: o_def)
  done

lemma client_preserves_giv_oo_client_map: "[| i < Nclients; j < Nclients |]
      ==> Client ∈ preserves (giv o sub i o fst o lift_map j o client_map)"
  apply (cases "i=j")
  apply (simp, simp add: o_def non_dummy_def)
  apply (drule Client_preserves_dummy [THEN preserves_sub_fst_lift_map])
  apply (drule_tac [!] subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
  apply (simp add: o_def client_map_def)
  done

lemma rename_sysOfClient_ok_Network:
  "rename sysOfClient (plam x: lessThan Nclients. rename client_map Client)
    ok Network"
  by (auto simp add: ok_iff_Allowed client_preserves_giv_oo_client_map)

lemma rename_sysOfClient_ok_Alloc:
  "rename sysOfClient (plam x: lessThan Nclients. rename client_map Client)
    ok rename sysOfAlloc Alloc"
  by (simp add: ok_iff_Allowed)

lemma rename_sysOfAlloc_ok_Network: "rename sysOfAlloc Alloc ok Network"
  by (simp add: ok_iff_Allowed)

declare
  rename_sysOfClient_ok_Network [iff]
  rename_sysOfClient_ok_Alloc [iff]
  rename_sysOfAlloc_ok_Network [iff]

text‹The "ok" laws, re-oriented.
  But not sure this works: theorem ‹ok_commute› i
declare
  rename_sysOfClient_ok_Network [THEN ok_sym, iff]
  rename_sysOfClient_ok_Alloc [THEN ok_sym, iff]
  rename_sysOfAlloc_ok_Network [THEN ok_sym]

lemma System_Increasing: "i < Nclients
      ==> System ∈ Increasing (ask o sub i o client) Int
                   Increasing (rel o sub i o client)"
  apply (rule component_guaranteesD [OF rename_Client_Increasing Client_component_System])
  apply auto
  done

lemmas rename_guarantees_sysOfAlloc_I =
  bij_sysOfAlloc [THEN rename_rename_guarantees_eq, THEN iffD2]


(*Lifting Alloc_Increasing up to the level of systemState*)
lemmas rename_Alloc_Increasing =
  Alloc_Increasing
    [THEN rename_guarantees_sysOfAlloc_I,
     simplified surj_rename o_def sub_apply
                rename_image_Increasing bij_sysOfAlloc
                allocGiv_o_inv_sysOfAlloc_eq']

lemma System_Increasing_allocGiv:
     "i < Nclients ==> System ∈ Increasing (sub i o allocGiv)"
  apply (unfold System_def)
  apply (simp add: o_def)
  apply (rule rename_Alloc_Increasing [THEN guarantees_Join_I1, THEN guaranteesD])
  apply auto
  done


ML ‹
 ML_Thms.bind_thms ("System_Increasing'", list_of_Int @{thm System_Increasing})
 ›

declare System_Increasing' [intro!]

text‹Follows consequences.
  The "Always (INT ...) formulation expresses the general safety property
  and allows it to be combined using ‹Always_Int_rule› b

lemma System_Follows_rel:
  "i < Nclients ==> System ∈ ((sub i o allocRel) Fols (rel o sub i o client))"
  apply (auto intro!: Network_Rel [THEN component_guaranteesD])
  apply (simp add: ok_commute [of Network])
  done

lemma System_Follows_ask:
  "i < Nclients ==> System ∈ ((sub i o allocAsk) Fols (ask o sub i o client))"
  apply (auto intro!: Network_Ask [THEN component_guaranteesD])
  apply (simp add: ok_commute [of Network])
  done

lemma System_Follows_allocGiv:
  "i < Nclients ==> System ∈ (giv o sub i o client) Fols (sub i o allocGiv)"
  apply (auto intro!: Network_Giv [THEN component_guaranteesD]
    rename_Alloc_Increasing [THEN component_guaranteesD])
  apply (simp_all add: o_def non_dummy_def ok_commute [of Network])
  apply (auto intro!: rename_Alloc_Increasing [THEN component_guaranteesD])
  done


lemma Always_giv_le_allocGiv: "System ∈ Always (INT i: lessThan Nclients.
                       {s. (giv o sub i o client) s ≤ (sub i o allocGiv) s})"
  apply auto
  apply (erule System_Follows_allocGiv [THEN Follows_Bounded])
  done


lemma Always_allocAsk_le_ask: "System ∈ Always (INT i: lessThan Nclients.
                       {s. (sub i o allocAsk) s ≤ (ask o sub i o client) s})"
  apply auto
  apply (erule System_Follows_ask [THEN Follows_Bounded])
  done


lemma Always_allocRel_le_rel: "System ∈ Always (INT i: lessThan Nclients.
                       {s. (sub i o allocRel) s ≤ (rel o sub i o client) s})"
  by (auto intro!: Follows_Bounded System_Follows_rel)


subsection‹Proof of the safety property (1)›

text‹safety (1), step 1 is ‹System_Follows_rel›\›

text‹safety (1), step 2›
(* i < Nclients ==> System : Increasing (sub i o allocRel) *)
lemmas System_Increasing_allocRel = System_Follows_rel [THEN Follows_Increasing1]

(*Lifting Alloc_safety up to the level of systemState.
  Simplifying with o_def gets rid of the translations but it unfortunately
  gets rid of the other "o"s too.*)

text‹safety (1), step 3›
lemma System_sum_bounded:
    "System ∈ Always {s. (∑i ∈ lessThan Nclients. (tokens o sub i o allocGiv) s)
            ≤ NbT + (∑i ∈ lessThan Nclients. (tokens o sub i o allocRel) s)}"
  apply (simp add: o_apply)
  apply (insert Alloc_Safety [THEN rename_guarantees_sysOfAlloc_I])
  apply (simp add: o_def)
  apply (erule component_guaranteesD)
  apply (auto simp add: System_Increasing_allocRel [simplified sub_apply o_def])
  done

text‹Follows reasoning›

lemma Always_tokens_giv_le_allocGiv: "System ∈ Always (INT i: lessThan Nclients.
                          {s. (tokens o giv o sub i o client) s
                           ≤ (tokens o sub i o allocGiv) s})"
  apply (rule Always_giv_le_allocGiv [THEN Always_weaken])
  apply (auto intro: tokens_mono_prefix simp add: o_apply)
  done

lemma Always_tokens_allocRel_le_rel: "System ∈ Always (INT i: lessThan Nclients.
                          {s. (tokens o sub i o allocRel) s
                           ≤ (tokens o rel o sub i o client) s})"
  apply (rule Always_allocRel_le_rel [THEN Always_weaken])
  apply (auto intro: tokens_mono_prefix simp add: o_apply)
  done

text‹safety (1), step 4 (final result!)›
theorem System_safety: "System ∈ system_safety"
  apply (unfold system_safety_def)
  apply (tactic ‹resolve_tac 🍋 [Always_Int_rule [@{thm System_sum_bounded},
  @{thm Always_tokens_giv_le_allocGiv}, @{thm Always_tokens_allocRel_le_rel}] RS
  @{thm Always_weaken}] 1›)
  apply auto
  apply (rule sum_fun_mono [THEN order_trans])
  apply (drule_tac [2] order_trans)
  apply (rule_tac [2] add_le_mono [OF order_refl sum_fun_mono])
  prefer 3 apply assumption
  apply auto
  done

subsection ‹Proof of the progress property (2)›

text‹progress (2), step 1 is ‹System_Follows_ask› and
  ‹System_Follows_rel›\›

text‹progress (2), step 2; see also ‹System_Increasing_allocRel›\›
(* i < Nclients ==> System : Increasing (sub i o allocAsk) *)
lemmas System_Increasing_allocAsk =  System_Follows_ask [THEN Follows_Increasing1]

text‹progress (2), step 3: lifting ‹Client_Bounded› to systemState›
lemma rename_Client_Bounded: "i ∈ I
    ==> rename sysOfClient (plam x: I. rename client_map Client) ∈
          UNIV guarantees
          Always {s. ∀elt ∈ set ((ask o sub i o client) s). elt ≤ NbT}"
  using image_cong_simp [cong del] by rename_client_map

lemma System_Bounded_ask: "i < Nclients
      ==> System ∈ Always
                    {s. ∀elt ∈ set ((ask o sub i o client) s). elt ≤ NbT}"
  apply (rule component_guaranteesD [OF rename_Client_Bounded Client_component_System])
  apply auto
  done

lemma Collect_all_imp_eq: "{x. ∀y. P y ⟶ Q x y} = (INT y: {y. P y}. {x. Q x y})"
  apply blast
  done

text‹progress (2), step 4›
lemma System_Bounded_allocAsk: "System ∈ Always {s. ∀i
                          ∀elt ∈ set ((sub i o allocAsk) s). elt ≤ NbT}"
  apply (auto simp add: Collect_all_imp_eq)
  apply (tactic ‹resolve_tac 🍋 [Always_Int_rule [@{thm Always_allocAsk_le_ask},
  @{thm System_Bounded_ask}] RS @{thm Always_weaken}] 1›)
  apply (auto dest: set_mono)
  done

text‹progress (2), step 5 is ‹System_Increasing_allocGiv›\
text‹progress (2), step 6›
(* i < Nclients ==> System : Increasing (giv o sub i o client) *)
lemmas System_Increasing_giv =  System_Follows_allocGiv [THEN Follows_Increasing1]


lemma rename_Client_Progress: "i ∈ I
   ==> rename sysOfClient (plam x: I. rename client_map Client)
        ∈ Increasing (giv o sub i o client)
          guarantees
          (INT h. {s. h ≤ (giv o sub i o client) s &
                            h pfixGe (ask o sub i o client) s}
                  LeadsTo {s. tokens h ≤ (tokens o rel o sub i o client) s})"
  supply image_cong_simp [cong del]
  apply rename_client_map
  apply (simp add: Client_Progress [simplified o_def])
  done


text‹progress (2), step 7›
lemma System_Client_Progress:
  "System ∈ (INT i : (lessThan Nclients).
            INT h. {s. h ≤ (giv o sub i o client) s &
                       h pfixGe (ask o sub i o client) s}
                LeadsTo {s. tokens h ≤ (tokens o rel o sub i o client) s})"
  apply (rule INT_I)
(*Couldn't have just used Auto_tac since the "INT h" must be kept*)
  apply (rule component_guaranteesD [OF rename_Client_Progress Client_component_System])
  apply (auto simp add: System_Increasing_giv)
  done

(*Concludes
  System : {s. k ≤ (sub i o allocGiv) s}
  LeadsTo
  {s. (sub i o allocAsk) s ≤ (ask o sub i o client) s} Int
          {s. k \<le> (giv o sub i o client) s} *)

lemmas System_lemma1 =
  Always_LeadsToD [OF System_Follows_ask [THEN Follows_Bounded]
                      System_Follows_allocGiv [THEN Follows_LeadsTo]]

lemmas System_lemma2 =
  PSP_Stable [OF System_lemma1
              System_Follows_ask [THEN Follows_Increasing1, THEN IncreasingD]]


lemma System_lemma3: "i < Nclients
      ==> System ∈ {s. h ≤ (sub i o allocGiv) s &
                       h pfixGe (sub i o allocAsk) s}
                   LeadsTo
                   {s. h ≤ (giv o sub i o client) s &
                       h pfixGe (ask o sub i o client) s}"
  apply (rule single_LeadsTo_I)
  apply (rule_tac k1 = h and x1 = "(sub i o allocAsk) s"
         in System_lemma2 [THEN LeadsTo_weaken])
  apply auto
  apply (blast intro: trans_Ge [THEN trans_genPrefix, THEN transD] prefix_imp_pfixGe)
  done


text‹progress (2), step 8: Client i's "release" action is visible system-wide›
lemma System_Alloc_Client_Progress: "i < Nclients
      ==> System ∈ {s. h ≤ (sub i o allocGiv) s &
                       h pfixGe (sub i o allocAsk) s}
                   LeadsTo {s. tokens h ≤ (tokens o sub i o allocRel) s}"
  apply (rule LeadsTo_Trans)
   prefer 2
   apply (drule System_Follows_rel [THEN
     mono_tokens [THEN mono_Follows_o, THEN [2] rev_subsetD],
     THEN Follows_LeadsTo])
   apply (simp add: o_assoc)
  apply (rule LeadsTo_Trans)
   apply (cut_tac [2] System_Client_Progress)
   prefer 2
   apply (blast intro: LeadsTo_Basis)
  apply (erule System_lemma3)
  done

text‹Lifting ‹Alloc_Progress› up to the level of systemState›

text‹progress (2), step 9›
lemma System_Alloc_Progress:
 "System ∈ (INT i : (lessThan Nclients).
            INT h. {s. h ≤ (sub i o allocAsk) s}
                   LeadsTo {s. h pfixLe (sub i o allocGiv) s})"
  apply (simp only: o_apply sub_def)
  apply (insert Alloc_Progress [THEN rename_guarantees_sysOfAlloc_I])
  apply (simp add: o_def del: INT_iff)
  apply (drule component_guaranteesD)
  apply (auto simp add:
    System_Increasing_allocRel [simplified sub_apply o_def]
    System_Increasing_allocAsk [simplified sub_apply o_def]
    System_Bounded_allocAsk [simplified sub_apply o_def]
    System_Alloc_Client_Progress [simplified sub_apply o_def])
  done

text‹progress (2), step 10 (final result!)›
lemma System_Progress: "System ∈ system_progress"
  apply (unfold system_progress_def)
  apply (cut_tac System_Alloc_Progress)
  apply auto
  apply (blast intro: LeadsTo_Trans
    System_Follows_allocGiv [THEN Follows_LeadsTo_pfixLe]
    System_Follows_ask [THEN Follows_LeadsTo])
  done


theorem System_correct: "System ∈ system_spec"
  apply (unfold system_spec_def)
  apply (blast intro: System_safety System_Progress)
  done


text‹Some obsolete lemmas›

lemma non_dummy_eq_o_funPair: "non_dummy = (% (g,a,r). (| giv = g, ask = a, rel = r |)) o
                              (funPair giv (funPair ask rel))"
  apply (rule ext)
  apply (auto simp add: o_def non_dummy_def)
  done

lemma preserves_non_dummy_eq: "(preserves non_dummy) =
      (preserves rel Int preserves ask Int preserves giv)"
  apply (simp add: non_dummy_eq_o_funPair)
  apply auto
    apply (drule_tac w1 = rel in subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
    apply (drule_tac [2] w1 = ask in subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
    apply (drule_tac [3] w1 = giv in subset_preserves_o [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
    apply (auto simp add: o_def)
  done

text‹Could go to Extend.ML›
lemma bij_fst_inv_inv_eq: "bij f ==> fst (inv (%(x, u). inv f x) z) = f z"
  apply (rule fst_inv_equalityI)
   apply (rule_tac f = "%z. (f z, h z)" for h in surjI)
   apply (simp add: bij_is_inj inv_f_f)
  apply (simp add: bij_is_surj surj_f_inv_f)
  done

end