/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H
#define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H
#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#include <linux/user-return -notifier.h>
#include <asm /nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm /io_bitmap.h>
#include <asm /fpu/api.h>
#include <asm /fred.h>
/* Check that the stack and regs on entry from user mode are sane. */
static __always_inline void arch_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) {
/*
* Make sure that the entry code gave us a sensible EFLAGS
* register . Native because we want to check the actual CPU
* state , not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen .
*/
unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
/*
* For ! SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry .
*/
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & mask);
/* We think we came from user mode. Make sure pt_regs agrees. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!user_mode(regs));
/*
* All entries from user mode ( except # DF ) should be on the
* normal thread stack and should have user pt_regs in the
* correct location .
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!on_thread_stack());
WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
}
}
#define arch_enter_from_user_mode arch_enter_from_user_mode
static inline void arch_exit_work(unsigned long ti_work)
{
if (ti_work & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
fire_user_return_notifiers();
if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_IO_BITMAP))
tss_update_io_bitmap();
if (unlikely(ti_work & _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
switch_fpu_return();
}
static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long ti_work)
{
fpregs_assert_state_consistent();
if (unlikely(ti_work))
arch_exit_work(ti_work);
fred_update_rsp0();
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/*
* Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT . Make sure we clear it before
* returning to user mode . We need to clear it * after * signal
* handling , because syscall restart has a fixup for compat
* syscalls . The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32
* selftest .
*
* We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386 : the 32 - bit tracer
* special case only applies after poking regs and before the
* very next return to user mode .
*/
current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
#endif
/*
* This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX ( ) , which is 10
* bits . The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
* when applying stack alignment constraints ( see cc_stack_align4 / 8 in
* arch / x86 / Makefile ) , which will remove the 3 ( x86_64 ) or 2 ( ia32 )
* low bits from any entropy chosen here .
*
* Therefore , final stack offset entropy will be 7 ( x86_64 ) or
* 8 ( ia32 ) bits .
*/
choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_ibpb_exit_to_user' */
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
this_cpu_read(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user)) {
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, false );
}
}
#define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void )
{
amd_clear_divider();
}
#define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
#endif
Messung V0.5 in Prozent C=93 H=77 G=85
[Dauer der Verarbeitung: 0.12 Sekunden, vorverarbeitet 2026-09-28]